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Procedure in Federal Courts-Assessment of Penal:ty
for Appeal Taken Only for Delay
In an appeal1 from a federal district court verdict and judgment
in a wrongful death action, appellees requested that damages be

assessed against the appellant because the appeal to the court of
appeals was sued out merely for delay. The appellees' request
was made under a rule of court2 which is common to all 11 circuit
courts of appeals 3 and is found in the rules of the United States
Supreme Court4 and many state appellate court rules. 5
1

2

1

4

5

American Hardware Ins. Co. v. Van Vick, 268 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1959).
"In all cases where an appeal shall delay the proceedings on the
judgment of the inferior court, and shall appear to have been sued
out merely for delay, damages at a ,rate not exceeding 10 per cent
shall be awarded on the amount of the judgment." 5th CIR. R. 30.
D.C. CIR. R. 23.
1st CIR. R. 32.
2nd CIR. R. 26.
3rd CIR. R. 33.
4th CIR. R. 20.
5th CIR. R. 30.
6th CIR. R. 25.
7th CIR. R. 26.
8th CIR. R. 21.
9th CIR. R. 24.
10th CIR. R. 25.
Supreme Court Rule 56.
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 814 (1940).
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 957, R. 26.
GA. CODE § 6-1801 (1933).
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 57 (50) (1957).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 211, § 10 (1931).
MISS. CODE ANN. § § 1971, 1972 (1942).
MO. REV. STAT. § 512, 80 (1949).
New Mexico-Supreme Court Rules, R. 17-3.
OHIO REV. CODE § 2505.35 (Anderson 1953).
ORE. CIV. LAWS ANN. § 19.160 (1953).
TEX. R. CIV. P. 438 (1948).
WASH. REV. CODE§ 251.23(3) (1953).
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared a rule similar to the one
under discussion to be unconstitutional in Moore v. Herron, 17 Neb.
697, 24 N.W. 425 (1885). In addition, note 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1925)
which provides for assessment of damages for delay after an appeal
to a higher court has been denied. This section also punishes appeals made for vexatious and frivolous reasons. See Lowe v. Willacy,
239 F.2d 179 (9th Cir. 1956). Also there is a provision in the patent
laws, 25 U.S.C. § 285 (1952), whidh provides that in exceptional
cases, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees to the injured
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The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 6 contained a provlSlon
penalizing appeals taken only for purposes of delay, and the
uniform rules for circuit courts of appeaF adopted in 1891 also
contained a section providing for assessment of damages against
the appellant in cases of appeals sued out only to delay proceedings on the judgment in the lower court.
In the instant case, a wrongful death action, the court held
that the appeal was not sued out merely for purposes of delay
although the court did find that there was little question but what
the verdict and the judgment below should be affirmed. The
court expressed a reluctance to award damages for delay largely
because of the "cogently put and earnestly argued brief of the
appellant." 8
There would seem to be some reluctance on the part of courts
of appeal to impose the penalty for delay. Only three times since
1940 have damages for delay been awarded, although the issue
has been brought up many times. 9
The Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in Traders & General Ins. Co. v. McClary 10 found that the appellants' main basis
for appeal was "purely factual" and the court further found that
the appeal was "so clearly without foundation on the present
record as to call for no discussion." Yet, the court said without
further explanation that it was not satisfied that the appeal was
sued out merely for delay.
What then will satisfy the courts of appeal that an appeal
is made out only for purpose of delay? The Court of Appeal for
the Eighth Circuit in May Department Stores v. Reynolds 11 said
that since the opinion of the court in a prior case had, for all
practical purposes, settled the law in that particular area, an award
of damages for delay was warranted. Only $250 was granted,

party in cases of delay or of vexatious or frivolous appeal. See
Day-Brite Lighting Co. v. Ruby Lighting Co., 191 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.
1951), and also a more recent case, Kemart v. Printing Arts Research
Lab. Inc., 269 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1959).
6 Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 23, 1 Stat. 85 (1789).
7 Rule 30, 150 Fed. xxxv (1891).
s American Hardware Ins. Co. v. Van Vick, supra note 1, at 184.
9 The Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit has considered the question eight times since 1940 and has awarded damages twice.
10 241 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1957).
11 140 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1944).
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however, instead of the maximum possible award of ten per cent
of the judgment in the lower court. 12
In 1950, again in the Eighth Circuit, damages for delay were
awarded in the case of Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz. 13
The court said the contentions of the appellant were wh-0lly without merit and awarded damages of $2,230 to the appellee - again,
however, a sum less than ten per cent of the judgment below.
The court's reasons for assessing the penalty included:
1. The appellant was given every opportunity to present every
conceivable defense in the trial court.
2. In deciding against granting a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict as requested by appellant, the trial court judge prepared an elaborate opinion covering every contention made by the
appellant in the trial court and in the court of appeals.
Nash v. Nash 14 in the Fifth Circuit is one of the few cases
wherein the court actually considered in the decision the advantageous effect of the delay which had been gained by the appellant. Here the enforcement of a judicial decree regarding a
property settlement in a divorce suit was held up pending appeal.
The court said the appeal was brought up entirely on technical
objections and the appeal had no basis at all in the substantive
law. Judgment was affirmed with damages for delay.
Where will the courts draw the line in favor of the appellant?
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied damages for
delay as requested by the appellee in National Surety Corp. v.
Williams 15 saying that "upon examining the record we are convinced the appeal was taken in good faith." (Italics added)
One reason for denying recovery for the appellee in Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lain16 was the submission of a brief
by the appellant that was 139 pages long which was said to be
one of several "indications of good faith" in taking the appeal.
(Italics added)
"In any case where an appeal has delayed proceedings on a judgment appealed from and shall appear to have been taken merely
for delay, damages not exceediig 10 per cent of the amount of the
judgment, in addition to interest, may be awarded and added to
the judgment." 8th CIR. R. 21.
13 182 F.2d. 752 (8th Cir. 1950).
14 234 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1956).
lu 110 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1940).
16 139 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1944).
12
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Most courts are very reluctant to invoke the rule. 17 The court
in Mason v. Summer Lake Irrigation Dist.18 said the appeal could
have warranted assessment of damages for delay, but the court
would not do so since it had not assessed damages for delay in
the past. The court did give warning that it would not hesitate
to invoke the rule in the future, however. 19
If there is a shield which might protect the appellant in cases
in which courts might question the motives and sincerity of the
appeal, the armor is composed of earnestness of argument20 and
vigorous and prompt prosecution of the appeal. 21
Earnestness and' vigorous prosecution should not be translated
into zeal on the part of counsel solely to win a case. In Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Feutz, 22 the court awarded
damages for delay saying that the appellees ought not to be required to pay expenses attributable to the excessive zeal of counsel
for the appellant.
The reluctance of the courts to invoke the rule does indicate,
however, that sincerity and hard work on the part of counsel as
manifested in his oral argument and briefs will preclude any
award of damages for delay.
Sam Jensen '61

